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 When I was a young man, still filled with youthful indignation and unflappable bravado, I 
crossed an ocean to a land far away where I took up arms on behalf of my countrymen, and 
helped fight a seemingly never-ending war. This introduction is not the story of that war, but an 
acknowledgement of failure, of trauma, and the effects each of those phenomena can have on the 
psyche of a young man. You see, I was a forward observer: I was trained in the art of battlefield 
destruction; I had, at my beck and call, the most prolific assortment of firepower known to man, 
and I was happy to use those weapons when and if the situation demanded it. Death and 
destruction . . . it's funny how quickly we become comfortable with such realities. And for two 
deployments, those realities are what I specialized in. I was a "King of Battle."1 But then, about 
three quarters of the way through my final deployment something happened. A close friend—
let's call him "C"—overdosed on heroin while sleeping in his rack, on our forward operating base 
in between missions, where no real danger loomed besides the now apparent danger we posed to 
ourselves. The problem was, I knew C had a history of drug use, and what's worse I knew he was 
using to a greater or lesser extent, and I did nothing to prevent it. "C" died on the 24th of that 
September, and two weeks later he was buried. I felt like I was buried right along with him, and 
maybe I should have been. Maybe I still should be for writing this text. After all, by articulating 
the situation textually, there stands the risk of devaluing the matter at hand. This concern is only 
compounded by the fact that I'm not confident in my right to invoke such an occurrence when the 
effects of my failures and losses pale in comparison to the loss experienced by his family. Still, I 
must press on. 
 
 1 For those unaware, "King of Battle" is a nickname for field artillery (13-series) soldiers 
in the Army, referencing the game of chess to describe its importance on the battlefield. 
Consequently, the infantry (11-series) is referred to as the "Queen of Battle" for its power and 
mobility. 
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  The next five years were nightmarish for me. In retrospect, I did what any "self-
respecting" idiot would do, namely, I punished myself and everyone around me, not only by 
detaching myself from my family and loved ones, but also through a variety of debaucherous 
acts, most prolifically a period of intense drug use. Situations such as these are not uncommon; 
similar observations are made by Shaili Jain in her manifold description of patient "Josh" in the 
prologue of The Unspeakable Mind.2 At this point it bears stating that I am deeply appreciative 
of Jain's investigation into post-traumatic stress, particularly her treatment of a veteran 
community that all too often is either handled with a sense of clinical sterility that borders on 
inhumanity, or that of pandering condescension, which, as anybody who knows a veteran will 
attest to, is not taken kindly to by those who have served. However, what strikes me most about 
Jain's text, and what typically strikes me about any text that looks at particular phenomena, is the 
lack of analysis of how trauma manifests in what Heidegger would refer to as average 
everydayness. For me, the everyday experience of my self-imposed trauma is not found in 
instances where I hold my breath driving through underpasses for fear of being Molotov 
cocktailed, although situations like those did, and continue to occur from time to time. Events 
such as those are what I refer to as ideal manifestations of trauma.  Instead—for me—the 
everydayness of my trauma manifests in the literal inability to recognize myself in the mirror for 
years after C's death. In this essay I interrogate average everyday manifestations and ideal 
manifestations of trauma using a comparative lens. By doing so, and by examining my own 
process of engagement after such experiences, I hope to develop the discussion surrounding post-
traumatic stress in such a way that more nuanced methodologies of healing can be illuminated.   
 
 2 Shaili Jain, The Unspeakable Mind: Stories of Trauma and Healing from the Front 
Lines of PTSD Science (New York: NY: Harper Collins, 2019), xii-xvi. 
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 So, what precisely does it mean when one refers to average everydayness? The term 
seems so self-evident, one might be inclined to argue, that it hardly warrants a discussion at all, 
but it is precisely that self-evidence that calls for a deeper understanding. If we do not understand 
why a given phenomenon is as it obviously is, or to speak more precisely what ground the 
phenomenon rests upon, then any further investigation into the matter will be little more than 
speculation, and in a matter as important as everyday trauma such speculation would be simply 
unacceptable. That said, the definition proffered by Heidegger for average everydayness3 is the 
Dasein's "Being-in-the world which is falling and disclosed, thrown and projecting, and for 
which its ownmost potentiality-for-Being is an issue, both in its Being alongside the 'world' and 
in its Being-with-Others."4 In fallenness Dasein "covers over" or conceals world understanding, 
whereas in disclosedness Dasein unconceals such understanding, and each modality always 
implies the other. So, where a particular matter is unconcealed, there is also always concealment, 
and vice versa. Similarly, to be thrown is to be made subject to the factical conditions of one's 
situatedness, whereas Dasein's projection is the relation of its self toward a given phenomenon as 
it pertains to Dasein's possibilities. Dasein is always thrown and projected simultaneously. The 
 
 3 Dasein literally translates to “there-being," and for Heidegger indicates the existential 
condition [eksistenz or eksistence depending on the text] of a being for whom Being is a concern 
i.e. human Being. While there is hardly time to fully expound upon the intricacies of this term at 
this time, for this particular article it should be understood that when Dasein is referred to it is to 
be taken as a qualitative descriptor for a human being. For future reference regarding the 
contents of this essay, Heidegger, in Letter on "Humanism" (page 247, see bibliography) 
specifically refers to eksistenz as the "standing in the clearing of Being" that allows the manifest 
world to occur as such to an individual human in the first place. 
 
 4 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John MacQuarrie and Edward Robinson 
(New York, NY: Harper Perennial, 2008), 226/H. 181. 
 It should be noted that in order to proceed in some reasonable fashion it was necessary 
for me to summarize Heidegger's much longer, and disparate discussions about matters of 
everydayness. For a more complete exploration of the matter it would do one well to peruse Part 
One of Being and Time. 
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issue of Dasein's ownmost potentiality-for-Being is a description of an individual's latent 
understanding of their specific, impending death, which will be discussed later. Lastly, the 
concepts of Being alongside the "world," and Being-with-others [mitdasein] describe the 
understanding that the Dasein is never in a position where it is not enmeshed in a world of 
relationships, whether those relationships be other people, or experiential things. While loosely 
describing these terms is important from a conceptual standpoint, what should be considered 
crucial in this instance is that each notion occurs simultaneously amongst the others in most 
instances. In short, these concomitant "states" describe the quintessential way Dasein is in its 
day-to-day eksistence, and it is precisely this quintessentiality that differentiates matters of 
everydayness—in this particular instance, trauma—from matters of ideality. 
 What, then, do I mean by ideal when referring to ideal manifestations of trauma? Most 
contemporary definitions of the word indicate that such a matter would be the most "perfect, or . 
. . best possible"5 version of a particular thing or phenomenon, and while such definitions have 
certain utility regarding the matter at hand, they are wholly underwhelming in comparison to the 
word's etymological root,  that being that which "[pertains] to an archetype or model."6 Here it 
would be unsatisfactory to understand of archetype as a mere pattern from whence other 
phenomenal manifestations occur, although that certainly does occur. Instead the most proper 
positive understanding of what an archetype is, or more importantly does, says Jung, is act as a 
 
 5 "Ideal," Cambridge Dictionary, accessed September 12, 2020, 
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/ideal. 
 





focal point around which psychological complexes form. 7Jung further notes that "active 
complexes put us momentarily under a state of duress, or compulsive thinking and acting for 
which under certain conditions the only appropriate term would be the judicial concept of 
diminished responsibility,"8 and, "depending on its energy charge . . . may appear either as a 
mere disturbance of conscious activities or as a superordinate authority which can harness the 
ego to its purpose."9 As I will soon demonstrate, this gestalt understanding accords with ideal 
manifestations of trauma as experienced by veterans, and ostensibly other PTSD survivors. 
 All that said, what do examples of ideal and everyday manifestations of trauma look like? 
Imagine, if you will, driving down a street you've driven down countless times before. It's a cool 
spring morning, and the sun shines intermittently through the billowy clouds. Monster Magnet's 
"Mindless Ones" is playing on the car stereo. You love this song.  Too few rock-and-roll bands 
have the nerve to be so unrepentantly nerdy that they'd mention Dr. Strange's Dormammu in 
their lyrics.  As you crest the ridge of the hill by the conservatory in the town you've lived in for 
the past twenty years, the shadow of the old train trestle appears in the valley below. An 
unexpected wave of terror washes over you. The music fades into oblivion, and you recognize 
the faint smell of biodiesel. All you can see is the trestle; all you can feel is the urge to reach 
behind you to locate your teammate's carbine. It's standard operating procedure for "gunners" to 
keep an M4 with them at all times so they can clear an impending obstacle before the convoy can 
continue.  Regardless of the fact that there have been relatively few such attacks during the war 
 
 7 C.G. Jung, "Recent Thoughts on Schizophrenia," in Psychogenesis of Mental Disease, 
trans. Gerhard Adler and R.F.C. Hull (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960), 254. 
 
 8 C.G. Jung, Structure& Dynamics of the Psyche, trans. Gerhard Adler and R.F.C. Hull 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), 96. 
 
 9 C.G. Jung, The Spirit in Man, Art, and Literature, trans. R.F.C Hull (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1978), 75. 
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on terrorism—if any at all—being molotoved is a popular concern among those who spend their 
days (and nights) sitting in the cupula.  Not being able to feel the buttstock of the rifle sends a 
shiver down your spine. By the time you turn around completely to check to see where it had 
fallen too, the horn from a car behind you startles you back into reality.  You've stopped in the 
middle of the road. Embarrassed, you speed off in your beat-up, old mustang . . . but you still 
hold your breath as you drive beneath the overpass.  
 Fast forward a few weeks: it's now early summer, and the window of your sparsely 
furnished apartment on the south side of town is open, allowing a sickly, pre-storm wind to waft 
in through the wire mesh. It's just barely cool enough to make it so you don't decide against 
getting up, and installing the brand-new Frigidaire air conditioner you'd purchased days earlier.  
As per your norm, you fall asleep clutching the raggedy pillow you've had for the last gods-
know-how-long in a way that resembles a full-nelson headlock.  Anything newer; anything softer 
would be entirely too much for you to be comfortable.10 You fall asleep with ease, though the 
peace is short-lived. You don't remember the dream that jolts you back into consciousness, but it 
does just that; you wake up as if somebody put hot coals down your shirt, with a gasp. A few 
meager drops of sweat roll down your brow, and you become keenly aware of the increased 
moisture surrounding your body. But it's nothing like the movies. You're not sopping wet, nor 
are you pouting uncontrollably. You simply know that something was wrong . . . no something is 
wrong in that other world you go to when you fall into sleep, and it feels like it's beginning to 
creep into this world, the one you supposedly now safely inhabit.11 After throwing your legs over 
 
 10 Anybody who has spent any amount of time in a combat unit will understand this 
sentiment. 
 
 11 see Medard Boss, The Analysis of Dreams, trans. Arnold J. Pomerans (London, UK: 
Rider, 1957). 
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the side of the bed, you shamble across the room, down the hall, and into the bathroom to take a 
drink of water, and splash your face. You do so uneventfully. However, upon looking up at the 
mirror, a strange, and horrifying thing occurs. You see the person in the mirror; you see the water 
running down his face. It makes the person staring back at you look like a splashed watercolor 
painting, the streaks of water distorting his angled cheekbones ever so slightly. Beyond that 
there's absolutely nothing about the person you are looking at that you can recognize; no 
distinguishing characteristic that helps you to recall any memory, any history of who he is, and 
how he relates to you. It's as if you've never seen this person before in your life. All you can do, 
after staring in disbelief for what seems like an eternity, is assure yourself that you are in fact 
alone in your apartment, after which you glance back at the mirror one more time, turn off the 
light, and return to bed. This phenomenon continues to occur, although in decreasing interval 
over the years, up to and through the present with little explanation as to why.12  
 
 While I do not have the luxury of exploring Boss' Daseinanalytic method of dream 
analysis here, it is an interesting set of ideas to keep because of the way he integrates the 
Heideggerian understanding of "world" into a psychotherapeutic framework. For Boss, dreaming 
and the un-conscious are no less "real" than the conscious world, and as such need to be 
examined in an almost phenomenological way, as opposed to the hyper symbolic approach used 
by theorists like Freud, and Jung. 
 
 12 see Eugene Mayer and Bruno Rossion, "Prosopagnosia," in The Behavior and 
Cognitive Neurology of Stroke, eds. Oliver Godefroy and Julian Bogousslavsky (New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 315-334, doi:10.1017/CBO9780511544880.017. 
 
 see Joel Patchitt and Sukhi S. Shergill, "Understanding Misidentification Syndromes 
Using the Integrative Memory Model," Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42, no. 295 (2019). 
doi:10.1017/S0140525X19001961. 
 
 see "Dissociative Disorders," National Alliance on Mental Illness, accessed September 
13, 2020, https://www.nami.org/About-Mental-Illness/Mental-Health-Conditions/Dissociative-
Disorders. 
 This story is in no way hyperbolic. Unfortunately, I cannot think of a better way to 
describe the circumstance than as I have done here, although it is my intent to continue revisiting 
this issue throughout the length of my career. That said, the first time this kind of situation 
presented itself to me, I panicked, as one might expect, and began researching the phenomenon. 
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 These examples constitute a particular manifestation of trauma, the former being an ideal 
manifestation whereas the latter is an everyday manifestation. Admittedly, there are reasonable 
arguments to be made that what I perceive to be an everyday manifestation of trauma might have 
nothing to do with my overseas experiences at all . . . and there is merit to that line of thinking, 
especially when one considers alternative explanations for the phenomenon such as 
physiological damage to the brain, or schizophrenia, which does, in fact, occur in my family (see 
Footnote 11).  However, given that neither phenomenon occurred prior to the death of C, and 
that both types of event typically occur within a reasonable timeframe of one another (although 
the latter occurs much more frequently than the former), I feel I have sufficient reason to believe 
that the two issues are entangled. That I have progressed in my own mental stability over the 
course of the last eight years, and that the rate of incidence of both forms of traumatic 
recollection have decreased precipitously since dealing with them as described only serves to 
strengthen this belief. Having said that, we can now ask the question: how are these two manifest 
forms of trauma different from one another? In order to answer this question it becomes 
necessary to first examine how they are the same. 
 The first thing that announces itself is that observation that in both instances I was 
engaging in a generally mundane activity, in the first instance, driving over a hill toward a train 
trestle that I have driven past and still drive past on nearly a daily basis; in the second instance I 
 
As best as I can tell there are three psychocognitive possibilities as to why this would occur: the 
first is prosopagnosia, otherwise known as "face blindness," although this seems unlikely since it 
is commonly linked with physiological damage of the brain. The second, and a more plausible 
explanation would be a misidentification disorder such as Capgras Syndrome, although that 
typically manifests in schizophrenics. The last, and most likely cause, as best as I can tell, would 
be a dissociative disorder such as "derealization" as described by the National Alliance on 
Mental Illness, which typically occur in relation to a traumatic event such as those experienced 
during military service. 
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was simply attempting to go to sleep. This observation itself is not nearly as important as the 
more subtle issue that in both instances I was in a relatively ambivalent mood, or as Heidegger 
might describe it, my attunement was one of ambivalence. What does this mean, to be attuned? 
For Heidegger attunement refers to a state-of-mind, that aspect of a thrown being's openness to 
the world that allows things to manifest or be encountered "in-the-world." By being attuned in 
such a way, things relative to that attunement make themselves known or are brought forth 
toward our Dasein.13 A simplistic understanding of this would be to consider the slightly 
exaggerated case of being-hungry. When hungry the world around you arrays itself so that those 
things relevant to your hunger manifest more readily than other things; that box of cold pizza in 
the fridge calls to you, and in it this way it is distantially "nearer" to you than other things in the 
room, for instance, a fly that has been annoying you all afternoon. It is not that you are ignoring 
the fly; to the contrary, by being-hungry the fly ceases to be, however momentarily. In the cases 
above, the relatively ambivalent attunement described means that I was simply attempting to 
exist within the mood of that given moment, be it enjoyment of the music while not crashing the 
car (a distinct difference from actively driving), or physically orienting myself so that I could fall 
asleep. 
 The only other substantiative similarity is that both situations (in fact all "situations") are 
hallmarked by a cathecting event. In the case of the springtime drive it is the sight of the trestle 
after cresting the hill, and in the case of the summertime night it is reasonable to suspect it was 
the dream that startled me back into consciousness. Interestingly, the Event [Ereignis] is a 
particular point of concern for Heidegger: for him it is not a simple matter of occurrence but "the 
 
 13 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John MacQuarrie and Edward Robinson 
(New York, NY: Harper Perennial, 2008), 176/H. 137. 
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temporal-spatial simultaneity for [Being] and beings."14 So, when Heidegger discusses the Event, 
he is describing the disclosure of an instance of meaningful appropriation. In effect, the Dasein 
becomes bound up or grounded in the Event, and it is the grounding of Dasein by Being in Being 
that is needed in order for Being, and the essential occurrence of the Truth to unfold.15,16 A 
simpler description of the unfolding of Truth is given to us by Michael Wheeler, who 
characterizes it as "the normal sense-making that follows a paradigm-shift," and while I feel as 
though this description would be dangerously simplistic for an extended discussion of the Event, 
for the purposes of this essay it will have to suffice.17  
 As best as I can tell the "minor" differences separating the described instances of trauma 
can be reduced to one significant difference—the potentiality for the radical alterity of "world"—
that affects the individual (namely, me) differently during the event itself. Here I understand the 
world  as "the manifestness of beings as such as a whole,"18 the "place" of the Dasein's relational 
possibilities; where attunements, the factical conditions of human existence, the human Dasein's 
temporal nature, and most prolifically the disclosing power of language and discourse [λόγος] all 
factor into the unconcealing and concealing of meaning in respect to the essence of beings. If we 
 
 14 Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), trans. Richard 




 15 Heidegger, Contributions, H. 5. 
 
 16 Heidegger, Contributions, H. 141. 
 
 17 Michael Wheeler, "Martin Heidegger," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford, 
2011, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/heidegger/. 
 
 18 Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, trans. by William 
McNeil and Nicholas Walker (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995), 284/§68. 
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assume the Oxford's definition of alterity as "the state of being other or different"19 to be 
accurate (or at least sufficient), then the radical or complete alterity of one's world  would be 
tantamount to the dissolution of reality as such within the temporality of the moment, although 
this should not be understood as saying the world itself would be rendered indeterminate. Such 
dissolution is only present in the case of the ideal. I am, for lack of better words, "far away" from 
the present moment; my "there-being" [da-sein] is no longer on the hill of my Pennsylvania 
hometown—either perceivably or temporally—but somewhere outside of Kabul's Jalalabad Road 
in Afghanistan. I do not hear Monster Magnet on my radio, but the sound (and smell) of traffic as 
we return to our forward operating base from having depot level maintenance performed on our 
vehicles. I no longer drive my mustang, but search frantically for a rifle so that I can clear the 
approaching overpass.20 I am attuned in such a way that these things are revealed to me. In 
juxtaposition, no such alterity occurs during the everyday manifestation of trauma. I am, for all 
intents and purposes, precisely in the place I was prior to falling asleep, albeit mildly unsettled 
and noticeably sodden in a comparative sense. In fact, the only thing that is "othered" in the more 
mundane experience is the "I." "I" am seemingly no longer present in the world as it stands. 
 Understanding this experiential difference, not just in terms of severity but as a root to the 
fundamental essence of my psychopathological state, was and continues to be an integral step in 
my personal movement toward recovery. But such an awareness did not simply appear 
overnight, nor did the mode of thinking that gave way to it. Here I am tempted to invoke 
 
 19 "Alterity," Oxford English Dictionary, accessed September 14, 2020, 
https://www.oed.com/oed2/00006546;jsessionid=8F255831E7A9978C468BC11B338F90A1. 
 
 20 This might seem highly specific for what is basically a vivid recollection of a memory. 
With that in mind, it should be noted that these occurrences happened most frequently moving 
away from civic centers such as Kabul because places such as those are where such overpasses 
tended to be. 
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Heidegger's notion of tautological thinking21 to describe my coping methodology, but the 
problem with that is that at that particular moment in time, when both instances of traumatic 
recollection were occurring most frequently, I was totally unaware of Heidegger's philosophy. In 
fact, by that point I had temporarily left school, and was actively in the depths of a heavy drug 
binge, the likes of which I will not describe any further in this essay.  Direction in regard to this 
issue would not occur until roughly two years later, after I had met my now wife, and returned to 
West Chester University. By that point I was a year "clean," and as anybody who has ever come 
off of drugs can attest to, I began to put on weight. Instead of allowing the issue to further 
depress me—because one is always depressed to a degree in such circumstances—I decided to 
get back into shape, and thus began going to the gym.  Inspiration, it seems, comes from the most 
unlikely of sources. One day, while running one day a strange, an intense video was randomly 
selected by YouTube for me to listen to as I coughed and wheezed my way around the indoor 
track at our gym. It was—oddly enough—the Ultimate Warrior reciting the entire first chapter of 
Orison Swett Mardon's seminal work, An Iron Will. Despite the profundity of the entire text, one 
comment made in reference to a quote from Henry Ward Beecher impressed itself upon me in a 
way that few others to this date have: "One of the secrets to a successful life is to be able to hold 
all of our energies upon one point, to focus all of the scattered rays of the mind upon one place or 
thing."22 
 
 21 Martin Heidegger, Zollikon Seminars: Protocols—Conversations—Letters, trans. Franz 
Mayr and Richard Askay, ed. Medard Boss (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2001), 
25 (see footnote). 
 
 22 Orison Swett Marden, An Iron Will, 
http://www.brainybetty.com/2007Motivation/Orison%20Swett%20Marden%20-
%20An%20Iron%20Will.pdf. 
 It should be noted that, while I have a physical copy of this text to cite, I chose to include 
a digital version since I thought it might be of some use to certain readers. 
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 What does it mean to "focus . . . the scattered rays of the mind upon one . . . thing?" It 
occurred to me that I had never really considered the matter of thinking about any particular 
thing in such a consequential way. Thinking was just something I did; something I took for 
granted. In the same way, I assumed "my condition" was just the way things were, and that that 
was the end of the story. However, Marden's quote gave me pause for concern over such apathy. 
To scatter can be taken as moving something far apart in many directions, or "to cover a surface 
with things that are . . . in no particular arrangement."23 Therefore, it is would be reasonable to 
suggest that being-scattered is to be disorganized, disoriented, or, to speak colloquially, to "be 
messed up," a good assessment of my psychological state at the time. To focus is to direct or 
give one's attention to a thing; to make clear,24 or more prolifically, bring into clearness.  Here it 
is important to consider that such thinking, while useful to a degree, might not be nearly as 
important for understanding instances ideal manifestations of trauma. Even in my uneducated 
state it seemed obvious to me that such instances were prompted by the revival of lived 
experiences, a line of thought that accords with the results of studies conducted by theorists like 
 
 23 "Scatter," Cambridge Dictionary, accessed September 16, 2020, 
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/scatter. 
 




Linda Levine,25 Laney et al.,26 and Kathy Pezdek.27 However, as it pertains to everyday 
manifestations of trauma, the idea of focusing one's mental energy on the phenomenon in 
question; to not accept it as simply given but to interrogate its meaning became the weapon I 
would use to fight the battle with my mind. 
 So, what does such focused thinking look like?  How does it occur? Models such as  
 The most typical response to that question, and the form of healing I have encountered most 
frequently during my many hours of therapy (both voluntary, and involuntary) accords with 
Jain's description of Psychological First Aid, namely that those seeking to aid the 
psychologically traumatized ought to [protect] survivors from further harm; [reassure] them that 
the trauma is over; connect them with family and friends, and other essential resources; and 
[give] them the opportunity to talk to a compassionate listener who is trained to respect their 
dignity, culture, and capacity."28 On the surface this approach seems perfectly reasonable, and 
shares similar concerns with more commonly known psychotherapeutic methodologies such as 
Viktor Frankl's logotherapy, and Carl Rogers humanistic model. However, the realization that I 
came to—the understanding so many of my brothers have come to—is that the most proper way 
to deal with trauma is not to push through it as if one were on a straight line, but "turning into" 
 
 25 see Linda J. Levine, "Reconstructing Memory from Emotions," Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General 126, no. 2 (1997): 165-177, https://doi.org/10.1037/0096-
3445.126.2.165. 
  
 26 see Laney et al., "Memory for Thematically Arousing Events," Memory & Cognition 
32, no. 7 (2004): 1149-1159, https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03196888. 
 
 27 see Kathy Pezdek, "Event Memory and Autobiographical Memory for the Events of 
September 11, 2001," Applied Cognitive Psychology 17 (2003): 1033-1045, 
doi:10.1002/acp.984. 
 
 28 Shaili Jain, The Unspeakable Mind: Stories of Trauma and Healing from the Front 
Lines of PTSD Science (New York: NY: Harper Collins, 2019), 245. 
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the trauma, skirting it if you will, and always keeping it in sight.  Why would anybody want to 
do such a thing? Jung had this notion about the circumambulation: "There is no linear 
evolution," he stated. "Uniform development exists, at most, only at the beginning; later 
everything points toward the center."29 Heidegger expressed a similar idea in his description of 
the necessity of resoluteness (i.e. being-authentic) when engaging with "the possibility of the 
absolute impossibility of [Being] i.e. death."30 The importance of this circumambulatory 
movement "around" the trauma is essentially hermeneutic: each moment spent observing the 
phenomenon in question is another opportunity to interpret the phenomenon, and each new 
interpretation brings about new opportunities to interpret and possibilities to understanding ad 
infinitum. Of central importance, says Gadamer, is the effect this process has on the Self: "Self-
understanding always occurs through understanding something other than the [S]elf, and 
includes the unity and integrity of the other."31 What this means is that through continued 
interpretation of my trauma, I not only come to understand the trauma, but I also come to a better 
understanding of my Self. 
 We are now ready to return to the original question of this investigation: how should we 
understand the essence of everyday manifestations of trauma, in this instance, the derealization 
of my Self in the mirror of my apartment bathroom after an undefined nightmare? What 
precisely is it to see one's Self—or anybody for that matter—in the first place? It is not self-
 
 29 C.G. Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, ed. Aniela Jaffé, trans. Richard and Clara 
Winston (New York, NY: Vintage, 1989), 197. 
 
 30 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John MacQuarrie and Edward Robinson 
(New York, NY: Harper Perennial, 2008), p. 294/¶ 250. 
 
 31 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. 
Marshall (New York, NY: Bloomsbury, 2013), 87. 
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evident, when I say I see my wife, that I am simply referencing another carbon-based lifeform of 
the same variety as me who I am legally obliged to "be with" that happens to reside in the same 
living-structure. That would amount to little more than the capacity for vision. But if we grasp 
"to see" at its roots—to see meaning to behold or experience32—then a better picture of what it is 
"to see" comes into focus: by seeing a given thing we hold it in a certain regard; we consider it in 
a particular way. When I see my wife, not only do I perceive her physically, I recognize what she 
means to me, both as an individual and in the context of my world; not just in the immediate 
sense, but simultaneously in the totality of her historical and potential being as she "manifests." 
That is why, when you are sufficiently invested in a relationship with a significant other, and 
realize that that person has been unfaithful for years, your ontological structure crumbles. The 
determinate nature of your world; your "knowledge" of the relationship as it occurred in the past 
and its possibilities for the future as well as any relationship connected to it falls apart like so 
many Jenga pieces.33 It is not simply that there is one facet of your significant other that you 
understood in an insufficient manner—the whole of their being as it pertains to you is thrown 
into question. 
  With that in mind, the question about whether one can ever really know one's Self is a 
question that has been a topic of discussion for some time now: Freud made the issue popular in 
his description of the ego and the id as being "like a man on horseback who has to hold in check 
 
 32 "See," Online Etymology Dictionary, accessed September 16, 2020, 
https://www.etymonline.com/word/see#etymonline_v_23104. 
 
 33 see Ryan Wasser, "The Ontological Significance of Foundherentism" (unpublished 
manuscript, September 12, 2020), https://philpapers.org/rec/WASTOS-2. 
 
 17 
the superior strength of the horse."34 Jung makes similar, albeit more nuanced observations about 
unconscious structures in The Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious,35 and as recently as 
2013 theorists such as Jonathan Haidt have alluded to the fundamental unknowability of the Self 
as it resides within a political framework.36 The point is that we never really know our Self as 
much as we would like to think we do, and it is precisely that "like we think we do" that gets us 
into trouble. In the previous example of the unfaithful spouse, it never occurs to the individual in 
question that that person they have built their life with could possibly comport themself in such a 
way, that they were capable of such deception. It is important here to recognize the profundity of 
a statement made by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, "that the line separating good and evil passes not 
through states, nor between classes . . .  but right through every human being—and through all 
human hearts."37 What makes this declaration so vital is the way it takes the onus of unethicality, 
and places it squarely of the shoulders of each individual: if my wife is capable of doing such 
things, then so am I. Unfortunately, too few people consider this possibility, instead preferring to 
moral grandstanding out of righteous indignation. 
 The fact of the matter is that I failed to understand that truism just as much as anybody, 
especially in my younger years. I enlisted in the military, and deployed to the Middle East with a 
 
 34 Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, ed. Ernest Jones, trans. Joan Riviere (London, 
UK: Hogarth Press, 1926), 30, https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.218607/page/n31/ 
mode/2up. 
 
 35 see C.G. Jung, The Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious, trans. R.F.C. Hull 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968). 
 
 36 Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 2013), 66. 
 Haidt's model references what he calls "The Elephant and the Rider," which has a 
distinctly Freudian ring to it. 
 
 37 Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago, trans. Thomas P. Whitney and Henry 
Willetts (London, UK: Vintage, 2017), 312. 
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certain set of preconceptions about my Self, about where I came from, about who I was at that 
time, and, to borrow the Gadamerian phrase, an inadequate understanding of the tradition from 
whence I came. After all, one is never the villain in their story; one always leaves home the hero. 
In my specific case, I prided myself on unyielding honesty, and on love and loyalty to my 
brothers. I thought I embodied the Army Core Values, most prolifically "personal courage."38  
Had I only lived up to that mythologized version of my Self, perhaps C would still be alive 
today. It is my honest belief—and the only evidence I have to support this claim is my improved 
mental state—that the unchecked incongruency between how I perceived my Self to be, and how 
"I" really was, how I suppose I really am to certain degree, is the causal link between my failures 
as a soldier and a friend, and my continuing, albeit significantly less frequent experiences of 
trauma-induced derealization. 
 This interrogation—if one can even call it that—will undoubtedly receive criticism from 
a variety of directions, most worrisomely those that focus on methodology. Admittedly, I have 
relied heavily on personal matters, and anecdotal claims to substantiate my thinking; a major 
academic faux pas. In many ways this text is very much an autoethnography, a genre I typically 
loath on principle. Such criticisms are not unwarranted. For instance, in a 2004 study Geoffrey 
Wolford discusses the problem that accompanies the practice of presenting recollected memories 
as historical fact, noting that “[i]f people wish to write fiction, they have every right to do so, but 
not every right to call it research.”39 Indeed. Autoethnographies should not form the crux of any 
 
 38 "The Army Values," U.S. Army, accessed September 17, 2020, 
https://www.army.mil/values/index.html. 
 
 39 Geoffrey Wolford, " Finding the limits: Autoethnography and being an Oxford 
University Proctor," Qualitative Research 4 (2004): 403-417, 
doi.org/10.1177/1468794104047238. 
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serious scientific study as the very notion stinks of academic impropriety. That said, my intent 
here was never to establish a categorical claim to knowledge, or to suggest some practice that 
ought to be held up as some panacea for trauma in toto. My only hope, in examining my own 
failures as a soldier and the effects those failures had on my existential condition, was that new 
passages forward—or possibly old passages that had simply been "covered-over"—can be hewn 
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